









In the Routledge Handbook of Ecocultural Identity, cultural ecologist and geophilosopher David 
Abram (2020) recommends abandoning the term Anthropocene in favor of calling our current 
epoch the Humilocene. Some may read Abram’s suggestion with an “enough already” attitude. 
We have the Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Platationocene, and Chtulucene.1 We have been 
over-ocened. But anyone familiar with Abram’s work knows the exacting yet soulful 
investigations of language of which Abram is capable and is likely to be interested in the 
proposed Humilocene.  
Abram is sensitive to scientists’ desire to highlight the devastating effects of human activity on 
Earth. He understands the rhetorical appeal of a term that calls out and calls on humans to do 
better, but he thinks that Anthropocene is too anthropocentric to get us there. The 
Anthropocene does not place us in a more-than-human world. Nothing exceeds us in the 
Anthropocene. The Humilocene, on the other hand, derives from humus: earth underfoot. It is 
from humus that we get human and humility. The Humilocene calls humans out, while also 
directing our attention to some necessary and well-earned humiliation at how poorly many of 
us have taken care of our home, our more-than-human family, and begging of us to move 
forward with humility (Abram 2020, 9).  
I agree with Abram, and I also acknowledge that a productive humility that inspires action is 
hard to achieve. When we look at those things which invite humiliation, it can be easy to fall 
into paralyzing despair or cognitive-dissonance-reducing anger. This is not limited to 
environmental issues, of course. Robin DiAngelo (2018) uses the term “white fragility” to 
illuminate how conversations about racism can so easily fatigue white people and invite a 
variety of defensive positions rather than motivating change. Thus, I argue that we need some 
help getting back to a state of humility. Literary critic Kenneth Burke (1973) told us long ago 
 
1 The Anthropocene is a term referring to a geologic epoch notable for the effects human activity has had on global 
climate and ecosystems. The term highlights the culpability of all humans—anthropos—and some critics have 
offered alternative -cenes that do not paint with as broad of a brush. The Capitalocene offers a Marxist critique of 
our current ecological crises by situating responsibility with global capitalism. The Platationocene is a critique of 
capitalism but also directs attention to the enduring effects of colonialism and racism. The Chtulucene names “a 
kind of time-place for learning to stay with the trouble of living and dying in response-ability on a damaged earth” 
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that literature can serve as equipment for living, and so that is where I begin my search for 
equipment for learning humility. In this paper, I offer the embodied rhetoric of St. Francis of 
Assisi as equipment for humility and, through that humility, living.  
My aim for this essay is not to be a hagiography of St. Francis. As such, when referencing St. 
Francis, I will refer to him as Francis, not to secularize his identity nor deny his honored position 
in the Catholic faith, but as a reminder that Francis’s way of listening, hearing, and responding 
to the world “are things that can happen to any one of us” (Sweeney 2019, 18). Because I am 
looking for equipment for living, my reading of Francis concentrates on those aspects of his life 
and teachings that I find most relevant and helpful to our present times. Such an emphasis 
should not be understood to suggest that Francis’s model is a perfect one. There are no 
infallible human or acts in this essay, which is—ironically—very Franciscan. Further, there are 
numerous places that one might find equipment for humility that is neither Franciscan nor 
Christian. For example, Robin Wall Kimmerer’s (2013) Braiding Sweetgrass offers a most loving, 
humble, and gracious kits for living well. I turn to Francis not for conversion but for Burkean 
identification (1969), that is, to be able to articulate deep ecology in a manner that identifies 
with the attitudes, ideas, and imagery already shared by so many people either as practicing 
Christians and Catholics or influenced by Christian culture.  
I begin this essay by addressing Lynn White, Jr.’s (1967) well-known critique that a particular 
reading of Judeo-Christianity, inherited from medieval traditions, is the cause of our current 
ecological crisis. I then briefly discuss some contemporary attempts to read the Old and New 
Testaments in a more harmonious with White’s critiques and recommendations. Next, I explore 
the embodied rhetoric of  Francis. I argue that Francis’s manner of embodying three of Cicero’s 
canons of rhetoric is relevant to contemporary rhetoricians and to deep ecologists. I conclude 
the paper by discussing the social functions performed (Herrick 2018) by Francis’s rhetorical 
style. I offer a Franciscan rhetoric to help us move through the humiliation, humility, and 
redemption afforded by Humilocene. 
 
Christianity Against Ecology? 
In 1967, Lynn White published an oft-cited article in Science positioning a prominent 
interpretation of the Judeo-Christianitian origin story found in Genesis as the root of the 
ecological crisis. There are many mobilizing Great Fall narratives in the environmental 
humanities. Great Fall narratives provide coordinates for locating influential paradigms that 
contribute to our instrumentalization of the more-than-human world. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(1755/2009) located the Great Fall as the time when the first person enclosed an area of land, 
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Great Fall more recently in Sir Francis Bacon’s—the “father of science”—promulgation of a 
science that was infused with attitudes of human domination of nature.  White (1967) argued 
that the Western science of Bacon and our industrial technology arose in a culture that already 
took for granted that “man” had a God-given dominion over (cf., Merchant 1989, 164 for a 
feminist critique of masculinity, technoscience rationality, and dominion), and the authority to 
exploit the Earth and all its creatures.  
White (1967) contended that science and technology will have little to offer in terms of solving 
ecological problems as long as the hegemonic view that earth exists for humanity persists. 
Consider the following analogy: Think of the products developed and marketed toward women 
in the early 20th century. While it is true that many products made tasks easier—vacuuming 
versus beating rugs, in-home dryers versus clothes line (each of which have their own ecological 
implications)—the products also arose from the dominant narrative of a woman’s role as a tidy 
housekeeper and then reinforced that narrative by providing tools to make upholding that 
narrative more efficient. Further, as technology helped women to perform chores more 
efficiently, there was less need for that work to be shared across the family, thus helping to 
solidify the view of household chores as work for “mother” (Cowan 1983). If technological 
advancements are produced within a culture that values earth as a resource for humanity’s so-
called “progress,” it seems likely that Earth would suffer the same fate as mothers. 
White, a historian of medieval European technology, had written favorably of the role 
technology plays in freeing humans from “mindless toil” but grew concerned about the 
exponential growth of our technologies within a paradigm of human exceptionalism and 
domination (Riley 2014, 243) 2. Thus, White (1967) stated that first, we need an alternative 
Christian view that displaces humans from atop the species hierarchy. He offers two possible 
solutions: one, find a new religion, or two, rethink Christianity.  
White is inclined toward the latter recommendation. Not only is it more pragmatic to work with 
existing faith communities and texts, White is a life-long Presbyterian who sought not to 
denounce all of Christianity but to extend its ethics of care to all of creation (Riley 2014). To be 
sure, we need varied and plentiful equipment for living humbly, and I believe that much of this 
equipment can and should be areligious. However, environmental humanities and activism 
would do well to consider White’s call for re-reading Christian texts. Approximately 75% of 
Americans identify as Christian (Pew Research Center 2015) and the United States is 
disproportionately responsible for anthropogenic climate change (Gillis and Popovich 2017). 
 
2 Old Testament scholar Norman Habel (2009) makes a similar point when he compares God’s punishment of the 
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This is not to say Christianity bears the disproportionate burden of anthropogenic climate 
change; rather, I am asserting that environmental activists would do well to consider how to 
articulate their causes with Christian morality3. For many people, the Bible is a master frame of 
reference from which all other frames—unconscious constructions through which individuals 
make sense of roles, structures, and relationships in the world —are derived4. Although 
communities will disagree on whether the Bible is an ontological document, it may be read as 
an important text conveying, for many, the “stories we live by” (Stibbe 2020, 2). 
One’s master frame is not primarily a matter of logos, or logical reasoning. Master frames are 
often matters of pathos and affiliation. It is important to recognize what kind of frame a 
theological frame is, to better understand what kinds of views, beliefs, and actions it might 
inspire. As literary critic John Gray (2019, 12) writes,  
… apologists for theism have tried to develop theories that explain the origins of 
the universe and humankind better than prevailing scientific accounts. In doing 
so they are conceding to science an unwarranted authority over other ways of 
thinking. Religion is no more a primitive type of science than is art or poetry. 
Scientific inquiry answers a demand for explanation. The practice of religion 
expresses a need for meaning, which would remain unsatisfied even if 
everything could be explained. 
White began the project of searching for a meaningful ecological theology himself in his famous 
essay and returned to this project throughout his last two decades of scholarship (Riley 2014), 
and others have continued this project in their own ways. Old Testament scholar Norman Habel 
(2009) queried if the “grey” texts of the Bible—those passages that couldsanction 
anthropocentric domination—could be read in a “green” way and suggests “retrieving” the 
Earth’s voice from the text. For example, when God grants Adam dominion over the Earth, we 
can hear Earth asking, “Where is the justice…Why should I be subdued” (Habel 2009, 68; 
emphasis in original). Another re-engagement with the foundational Christian text comes from 
The Green Bible (TGB, 2008). TGB offers substantial essays, tips, resources, and an 
environmental-themed topical index. Whereas Habel develops a new hermeneutical approach 
for reading the Bible, TGB offers a New Revised Standard Version of the Bible with its more-
than-human themes colored green. Both approaches have their affordances and constraints, 
 
3 Of course, environmental issues extend beyond climate change: the Trump administration’s relaxation of laws 
protecting endangered species and public lands, global deforestation associated with unsustainable dietary habits, 
out-of-control consumption of plastic and other commercial products that wind up contaminating the oceans and 
killing countless marine creatures—to name but a few. 
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and they are certainly not the only approaches to “greening” Christianity (cf. Evangelical 
Environmental Network 2020).5 
In this essay, I pick up with White’s (1967) hunch that a greener Christianity would rely heavily 
on the teachings of  Francis of Assisi. “Possibly we should ponder the greatest radical in 
Christian history since Christ: Saint Francis of Assisi…. The key to understanding Francis is his 
belief in the virtue of humility—not merely for the individual but for man (sic) as a species” 
(White 1967, 1206). White would go on to further detail Francis’s radicalness and assert  
Francis’s teachings move us from the dominion-stewardship binary and into a “spiritual 
democracy of all God’s creatures” (White 1973, 61). Whether or not the editors read White’s 
(1967) text, they seemed to have arrived at a shared conclusion about how to recast 
Christianity: An effective framing of Christian environmentalism begins with  Francis of Assisi. 
Once inside the cover, immediately after the title page, before the books of the Bible are listed, 
TGB begins with the poem “Canticle of the Creatures” by Saint Francis of Assisi. Thus, before 
encountering any of the text of the Bible, we are first offered a text inviting us to consider that 
Sun is our “brother” and is made in God’s likeness; that Wind, Water, Moon and Fire are all our 
siblings; and that Earth is our “sister” and “mother” who governs us (TGB 2008, front matter). 
Using St. Francis as the lens for looking at TGB—and for doing daily life—requires an 
exploration of how St. Francis’s life and teaching function rhetorically. 
 
The Embodied Rhetoric of Giovanni di Pietro di Bernardone 
Although I agree with White (1967) and TGB that Giovanni di Pietro di Bernardone, better 
known as Francis, is the best candidate for introducing a Green Christianity, I am concerned 
with some of the interpretations that “Canticle of the Creatures” affords. While some readers 
see continuity between humans and nature, others, including notable writer G. K. Chesterton, 
focus on the word “sister” in Francis’s phrase “Sister Mother Earth”. While the outcome of this 
interpretation is still one of care—Chesterton writes, “Nature is a sister, and even a younger 
sister … to be laughed at as well as loved” (TGB 2008, I-45)—it positions humanity as equal to, if 
not slightly superior to, Earth. This view makes it easy to fall back on anthropocentric 
 
5 Atmospheric scientist Katharine Hayhoe is a prominent voice working to bridge the gap between science and 
Christian communities. Hayhoe is an evangelical Christian and the director of Climate Science Center at Texas Tech 
University. When she is not conducting her research, she presents a message of creation care (e.g., via TED Talks, 
Years of Living Dangerously, helping train new Climate Reality presenters). Creation care is a commitment to 
a ministry that educates, inspires, and mobilizes Christians in their effort to care for God's creation, to be faithful 
stewards of God's provision, to get involved in regions of the United States and the world impacted by pollution, 
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justifications for the treatment of Earth. For example, if the Earth is our little sister, then 
hegemonic notions of both gender (e.g., it is chivalric for males to protect females) and age 
(i.e., adults/elders are to guide the less mature) would tell us it is our duty to protect Earth from 
herself.  
In the rest of this essay, I first discuss Francis as a rhetorician and what rhetoric has to offer 
deep ecology. I then explore two questions to get to the heart of Francis’s rhetorical appeal: 
how can Francis be understood as a fundamentally embodied rhetor and what does Francis’s 
embodied rhetoric do for the more-than-human world today? Francis has been called a 
pantheist, Protestant, devout Catholic, Catholic liberationist, and heretic (Sorrell 1988). Most 
importantly for this essay, I will call him a human. 
 
Why Francis and Why Rhetoric? 
Francis is the most obvious choice for a figure in the Christian faith tradition who inspires 
sentiments harmonious with deep ecology. Devall and Sessions (1985, 92) reference Francis as 
a source of a deep ecological perspective and share his “Canticle of Brother Sun, Sister Moon”. 
White (1967) identified Francis as the most obvious choice of model for a helpful change in 
course of Christian thinking. Scholars from many disciplines have looked to Francis for guidance 
on how to live in a more-than-human world. Pope Francis took the saint’s name for guidance 
and inspiration and is the first pope to offer an encyclical on environmental concerns (for 
various and detailed ecologically philosophical perspectives on the Pope’s encyclical, see The 
Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy’s 2018 and Environmental Humanities’s 2016 special foci on 
Laudato si).  
It may be somewhat less obvious why I position Francis as a rhetorician. For some, “rhetoric” 
leaves a bad taste in the mouth. Popularly, some connote rhetoric with the sort of hot-winded 
and empty promises, pleas, and apologies made to either whip up votes or manage one’s public 
image. In academia, some see contemporary rhetorical studies as critically reactive, offering 
little generative value—not actually delivering any equipment for living. Rhetorical criticism 
may have, like Latour (2004, 225) suggests of all varieties of critical studies, “run out of steam”. 
A full recounting of the generative capacities of rhetoric is beyond the scope or purpose of this 
paper, but highlighting a few examples may help make sense of my focus on Francis’s role as 
rhetor. Aristotle defined rhetoric as an ability to observe all “the available means of persuasion” 
(Aristotle 1991, 36). By seeing rhetoric as encompassing all the available means of persuasion, 
we do not limit our studies to mindful, deliberate speechcraft and delivery but welcome an 
investigation of the everyday ways in which we may be moved by the words, actions, beliefs, or 





Cynthia Rosenfeld 28 
understood this when he wrote of rhetoric as pre-lingual and pre-human. Of Cicero’s (1976a) 
three aims of oratory—to teach, to delight, and to move—none of them actually require 
oratory. 
This is not to say that Francis could not be understood as a classical oratorical rhetor. Below, I 
discuss how his adeptness at memoria contribute to his persuasive, poetic mode of address. 
However, to focus solely on Francis’s speechcraft would neglect what I hope to demonstrate as 
Francis’s most powerful persuasive appeals: his embodied rhetoric. Francis’s emphasis on 
embodied experience is so well developed that long before we had the language of “rhetorics 
of display” (Prelli 2006), or formally recognized the pedagogical value of situated learning (cf. 
Gallagher, Renner and Glover-Rijkse’s 2020 article exploring how a virtual recreation of a 
Martin Luther King speech enables learning and inspires social consciousness), Francis “realized 
how powerful it can be to imagine oneself contemporary with Jesus in events such as his 
Passion and Nativity” (Sweeney 2019, 26). His teachings formed the basis for the embodied 
rituals of the Stations of the Cross and the Nativity crèche (Sweeney 2019).  
 Francis offers a compelling understanding of embodied rhetoric: relational bonds are not 
formed solely or primarily through elaborate speech acts; they are manifested in and through 
our creaturely being. Francis offers “devotional experience” rather than “abstract doctrine” 
(Coupe 2013, p. 104, emphasis mine). Francis “used gestures to communicate, and shows of 
emotion before others” (Sweeney 2019, 2). He “used his dramatic flair” that he “learned from 
entertainers and storytellers who were popular in late medieval Europe” to “awaken others” 
(Sweeney 2019, 4). He would often begin his services with dance, “transforming his sermon into 
a kind of musical entertainment, full of lively rhythms” (Dario Fo quoted in Sweeney 2019, 4). 
How Francis used his body may seem a banal choice of exploration. What is more transient and 
ephemeral than a gesture? Sermons can be transcribed and become preserved in cultural 
memory. But reading The Little Flowers of St. Francis of Assisi, there is a great deal of attention 
paid not only to what Francis said but what Francis did. Francis taught not only by instruction 
but by action. Francis, Cunningham (1972) writes, did not love humanity or nature in abstract. 
He loved them individually—human by human, wolf by wolf, stone by stone—easily and often.  
Exploring how Francis embodies rhetoric and how his rhetoric is embodied contributes to our 
understanding of both ecological theology and rhetoric. Cicero (1976b) told us that the five 
canons of rhetoric are inventio (coming up with the idea), dispositio (the ability to arrange and 
organize), elocutio (style choices, which includes gesture, tone, pace, word choice, and 
practices of visualization), memoria (knowledge and understanding), and actio (the act of 
delivery, including eye contact, dress, posture). Bacon’s conception of rhetoric moved from 
studying rhetoric’s operations/canons and occasions (i.e., epideictic, deliberative, or forensic) 
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rhetoric has on the faculties (Cogan 1981). However, the operations of rhetoric need not be 
read as counter to understanding rhetoric as an active art, as I believe Francis’s instantiations of 
actio, memoria, and disposito make clear. 
 
Actio and the Wolf of Gubbio 
In The Little Flowers of St. Francis of Assisi, the story is recounted of how Francis counseled a 
wolf outside the town of Gubbio. The wolf had killed not only animals of the town but some of 
the human citizens, as well. Francis decided to go meet the wolf, despite the warnings of the 
townspeople. The people watched as Francis approached the wolf, who lunged at him. Francis 
did not raise an arm to the wolf but commanded the wolf to do no harm. He came gently to 
Francis, who then discussed with the wolf—as the story is a dialogue between a chatting man 
and a yielding wolf—his concerns over the wolf’s attacks. Francis tells the wolf that he “merit[s] 
the gallows” (Ugolino 1390/1998, 48) for his actions. However, Francis desires that peace be 
made between the town’s people and the wolf. The wolf shows submissiveness by lowering his 
head. Francis takes this behavior as indication of the wolf’s humble acceptance of Francis’s 
request. Francis then promises the wolf that he will see to it that the wolf is regularly fed, as he 
understands that the wolf’s actions were brought about by hunger. The wolf then follows 
Francis back to a town of astonished citizens who have gathered in the piazza to see Francis 
with the wolf. To those gathered in the piazza, Francis says, 
Hear ye, my brethren. Friar wolf, who is here before you, has promised and 
sworn fealty to me, that he will make peace with you and never more offend you 
in anything. Do ye now promise him to give him what he needs every day, and 
for him I give you my word that he will faithfully observe this covenant of peace. 
Francis then asked the wolf to plead fealty again in front of the people, and the wolf placed his 
right paw in the hand of Francis, at which sight “the people were filled with great joy and 
wonder alike” (Ugolino 1390/1998, 49). The wolf is said to have lived two more years in the 
town, spending his remaining days welcome by the town’s citizens, being well-fed, and dying of 
old age. 
Of course, one could read this story as an allegorical tale promoting domestication. Indeed, 
Francis tames the wolf by initially commanding him in Christ’s name6. and there is a very long, 
well-known, and ugly history of the atrocities committed when Christians have commanded 
 
6 As with the recent scientific theories that recognize the wolf’s participation in domestication, it would be a 
mistake to consider the wolf at Gubbio as lacking agency in this encounter. The point being made here concerns 
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Others—thus conceived as radically and problematically different—to act “in Christ’s name”. 
We could be tempted here to go down a tragic route and seek to purify ourselves of Christianity 
for these sins. However, I would prefer we tend to Burke’s notion of the comic frame. Much like 
White’s call to re-read the Christian creation narrative through a Franciscan lens, the comic 
frame is concerned with re-birth rather than death. The comic frame allows us to be aware of 
our errors so as not to repeat them. We may learn the ultimate lessons of “humane 
enlightenment” when we admit our errors with humility (Burke 1937/1984, 41). To view the 
atrocities mentioned above in a comic frame is neither to negate them nor diminish their 
horror but is an attempt to salvage the good in our necessary renovations.  
As critics, when we are careful of the destructive and salvage the productive, we offer “arenas 
in which to gather” (Latour 2004, 246). The arena or piazza for gathering in this tale of Francis is 
his humble method of actio. I refer to his actions in this story as actio and not elocutio because I 
do not read Francis’s actions as pre-determined stylistic choices, but as a mindful rhetor 
attending to his audiences and adjusting his posture, gaze, and actions as he goes along. In this 
story, Francis’s actio places Francis—already a respected figure— in what Carolyn Marvin 
(2006) calls “the body class”.  
Marvin (2006) elucidates the troubling distinction between the textual class and the body class. 
The textual class, which includes politicians, clergy, and academics, is skilled at using texts that 
shield and preserve their bodies from hardship and danger. Presidents do not raise swords but 
sign documents to send people to war. Clergy can save or damn souls at a distance, and 
academics—like myself—can point to problems that they ask others to address. Meanwhile, the 
body class is asked to do the hard and dangerous work. Although Francis was already a 
respected religious leader when he encountered the wolf outside Gubbio around year 1220, 
he—of his own doing—never left the body class. Francis rarely wrote, though he sometimes 
asked his companions to write down his ideas. Francis gave up a life of ease associated with the 
material wealth he was born into and instead chose to effort at sustaining his existence. Francis 
served and cleaned the bodies of people who had an infection caused by Mycobacterium 
leprae, which produces a disease known as Hansen’s disease today and leprosy in Francis’s time 
(Sweeney 2015, 2019; Ugolino 1390/1998).  
Thus, at Gubbio, the body of this respected spiritual leader is the material rhetoric: he places 
his body between the townspeople and the wolf. Owing to Francis’s modest manner of 
existence, the townspeople could see themselves in Francis’s body, even if they did imagine his 
spirituality exceeded theirs. He did not approach the wolf with any advanced weaponry or 
alchemical concoction to which they would not have access. He approached and risked his 
body, for the sake of the wolf and for the sake of the people. In Spinoza and Deep Ecology, Eccy 
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“to address what might be termed the human rights issue”. In Francis’s ministry at Gubbio, we 
are reminded that care for human creatures is not in opposition to care for the more-than-
human world. Caring for humans is caring for beings whose intrinsic worth is a fundamental 
recognition of deep ecology (Devall and Sessions 1985). At the same time, Francis directs the 
citizens’ attention away from the wolf’s previous harms and toward the wolf’s intersubjective 
struggle for survival. Francis used his body to create a community that included the wolf. 
 
Memoria and the Things Francis Carried 
Memoria may seem an odd choice for emphasis in the so-called Information Age, an era 
marked by economy dependent on information technology. We have “all the data typically 
needed in business or any endeavor … instantly accessible from a desktop personal computer” 
(Gillis and Popovich 2017). With “information at your fingertips” (Markoff 1990), why put the 
cognitive labor into carrying information in your mind? According to Plato (1995), Socrates 
warned that writing would encourage mental lethargy; we would no longer recall information 
from within ourselves but always direct our knowledge to the external marks of letters on a 
page. Knowing where to look something up is not true wisdom but a semblance of wisdom, 
according to Socrates.  
Francis was a reluctant writer and a sporadic reader (Sweeney 2015). However, he loved to 
listen to people and knew many of the poems of troubadours by heart. Francis exhibits a mode 
of attending to the more-than-human world that allowed Francis to carry stories with him, in 
his body. These stories were then available for his recall, to be re-arranged (dispositio), re-
presented, and brought to life again in myriad situations. For example, Sorrell (1988, 70) states 
that: 
Francis knew troubadour poetry by heart and quoted it to advantage on 
occasion. Once he was drawn to attend a dubbing ceremony, and gave a sermon 
based on the chivalric couplet, “I aspire to so great a treasure/That all pain for 
me is pleasure”—thoughts that … reveal a process of reinterpretation he must 
often have applied to the lyrics he knew and loved. 
 The above story serves to illuminate why Charles Darwin (2004) stated that attention—a sense 
of curiosity and an ability to become absorbed by that to which one is attending—is a faculty of 
utmost importance. We often dismiss memorization in our modern practices of learning, and 
surely memorization alone is incomplete for any philosophical or pedagogical purpose. 
However, there is something compelling about how we carry our observations, encounters, 
quotes, poems, and our beloved lyrics. I carry a notebook with me so that I may jot down to-do 
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the note written now, the release of the pressure to remember. Sometimes, I take a 
photograph for similar purposes. I see a black racer snake on a walk in the woods, and I ask my 
partner to fetch the camera so that we may remember the snake after the encounter. Deep 
ecology is a commitment to asking deeper questions (Naess in an interview with Bodian 1995), 
and here Franciscan rhetoric raises some evocative questions for me. What if I endeavored to 
remember more encounters and more beings in my body? What if I inscribed the encounter not 
in graphite or pixels but in my cells? Might I be more persuasive if I could quote Francis or 
Naess from heart rather than from text?  
 
Dispositio and Francis’s Cortesia 
Sorrell (1988, 69) claims that many official biographers “display an ecclesiastical bias against the 
secular ideals of chivalry” and so have downplayed the profound influence that chivalry had on 
Francis7. I suggest that we read chivalry and religion diffractively in Francis’s life. Diffractive 
readings can be understood as “respectful engagements with different disciplinary practices” 
(Barad 2007, 93) and understanding how boundaries have been made and how they can be 
remade toward inclusion. To read chivalry and religion diffractively in Francis’s life is not to look 
for a singular, anchoring center from which all acts could be properly understood but, rather, to 
read his chivalric acts through his religion and to read his religion through the phenomenon of 
chivalry. Francis’s ability to arrange ideas, beliefs, and meanings—his ongoing, lifelong 
enactment of dispositio—is particularly compelling and is perhaps best exemplified through his 
arrangement of codes of chivalry diffracted with religious teachings. 
Sorrell (1988) describes the great courtliness (cortesia-curialitate) of Francis. Courtliness, 
curialitas, is a chivalric code of moral terms, a measured role of action, and an embodiment of 
the code of conduct of nobility, which includes a joyful disposition, helpfulness, 
considerateness, and courage (Rubinstein 2004). Cortesia can be understood as courtesy, but 
Sorrell (1988) instructs us that Francis’s courtesy is not our commonsense understanding of 
courtesy. Rather, Francis’s cortesia is a courtesy of spiritualized largesse and noblesse oblige, a 
courtesy that maintains the dignity of all interacting individuals, and is a relative of charity.  
Cortesia, Francis said, “extinguishes hatred and keeps love alive” (Sorrell 1988, 72).  
 
7 Roger Sorrell (1988) uses sources even earlier than The Little Flowers of St. Francis, which is a primary source for 
this essay and for the Sweeney (2019) text, which is also fundamental to my accounting of Franciscan rhetoric. 
Sorrell states that because Little Flowers was written about a century after Francis’s death, the more 
contemporaneous accounts by Thomas of Celano (First Life of Francis) and compiled by Brother Leo and other 
companions (The Legend of Perugia) should be considered more trustworthy. Sorrell also notes that Little Flowers 
is the most popular accounting of Francis’s stories, and it is because of its popularity and circulation that I find it a 
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That Francis is known to extend cortesia to human strangers (see numerous accounts in 
Sweeney 2015, 2019; Ugolino c. 1390/1998) is perhaps unsurprising of someone the Catholic 
faith has deemed suitable to bestow sainthood. What makes Francis unique is his extension of 
cortesia to the more-than-human world. Francis’s cortesia to more-than-human animals is well-
known, such as when Francis convinced a young man to give Francis the turtledoves that the 
young man had captured. Francis released them from their cage and built nests for them 
(Ugolino 1390/1998, 50). But Francis’s concern extended beyond kingdom Animalia and, 
indeed, beyond life as we understand it.8 
Long before Jane Bennett’s (2009) Vibrant Matter invited us to respect inanimate matter, 
Francis was “lovingly” patching tunics (Sweeney 2019, 32) and instructing others to “walk 
carefully over them” (Sweeney 2019, 31). Centuries later, poet Mary Oliver (2014, 71) would 
ask us if stones feel and would say that while most of the world says no, she refuses “to think to 
such a conclusion/too terrible it would be, to be wrong”. Kantian moral philosopher Christine 
Korsgaard also finds herself tempted by the extension of consideration to inanimate objects: 
“At the risk of being thought a complete lunatic … perhaps we should treat every kind of thing 
in accordance with its nature, in accordance with the kinds of goods and evils to which it is 
subject” (2018, 94, emphasis hers). 
What makes Francis’s treatment of tunics and stones compelling and harmonious with deep 
ecology is that his treatment is a way of being, a spiritual cortesia, that does not require a 
propositional calculus-style reasoning to decide what entities merit consideration and under 
what circumstances. Because he saw the Creator in all creation, cortesia was a given. 
Through exploring Francis’s facility with actio, memoria, and dispositio, we have come to an 
understanding of how Francis embodies rhetoric. Now, we direct our attention to what kind of 
work Francis’s embodied rhetoric performs. Contemporary rhetorical critics tend to concern 
themselves more with what a thing does than what a thing means. Rhetorical scholar James 
Herrick (2018) asserts that the art of rhetoric performs the social functions of assisting 
advocacy, distributing power, and building community. The embodied rhetoric of Francis 
described above offers insight into rhetorical practices that assist advocacy through 
transforming everyday experience, building community by cultivating an unqualified love for 




8 Tarizzo (2017) offers a compelling, Foucauldian accounting of when and how we came to understand the force-
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Assists Advocacy: Transforming Everyday Experience 
Rhetoric is how we direct attention to our private ideas, how we advocate for what we believe 
(Herrick 2018). There are some powerful tales in the Franciscan legacy, such as the accounting 
of the ministering to the wolf outside Gubbio. However, what is more significant to Francis and 
to deep ecologists than such exemplary, singular acts is Francis’s transformation of daily life. 
The banal, the everyday, the routinized constitute our lives, and it is in our daily lives that we 
“negotiate relations with globalized consumer culture” (Dickinson and Maugh 2004, 259). It is in 
our practices of daily life that we can most come to understand that we are “bound in an 
interdependent relationship to our conception of the world” (Naess 1989, 56) and increase our 
identifications with the more-than-human world. Francis certainly embodied a most 
transformed living. He went from being adorned with the nicest of clothes to lovingly patching 
drab, earthy robes. He thought caves were ideal locations for prayer. He referred to humans, 
birds, stones, and death as siblings. He was not fond of monastic book culture because he saw 
that attention to textuality could encourage forgetfulness of one’s embodiment. He asked his 
followers to joyfully serve the needs of others (Sweeney 2019). Francis’s daily life was an 
embodied appeal to other, possible ways of living.  
This is not to say that there cannot be a kaioritc, or opportune moment, for transformation and 
that rhetorical events cannot be the inspiration for such transformation. Certainly, Francis’s 
interaction before the people of Gubbio was a powerful and timely event. However, what is 
most important to my reading of Francis’s interaction with the wolf is what happened after his 
talk in the piazza. The people interacted differently with the wolf. They fed the wolf. The wolf 
came and went amongst the people and their homes. Their day-to-day relationship changed. 
What Francis did in the piazza, his way of living among and with wolves, was achievable for 
every person of Gubbio.  
The focus on day-to-day transformation is not meant to ignore the infrastructural, political, and 
industrial changes needed to address an issue like climate change, nor is it intended to evoke 
the bright green critiques that deep ecologists espouse “disenchanting notions of living in a 
fallen world” and “nostalgic visions of transcendent future in which might, once again, live in 
harmony with nature through a return to … hunter-gatherer life” (Schellenberger and Nordhaus 
2011). Rather, it is a recognition that:  
The meaning of life is not a solution to a problem, but a matter of living in a 
certain way. … It is not something separate from life, but what makes it worth 
living … a certain quality, depth, abundance, and intensity of life … salvation 
turns out to be an embarrassingly prosaic affair—a matter of feeding the hungry, 
giving drink to the thirsty, welcoming the stranger, and visiting the imprisoned. … 
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Although the above quote comes from literary critic Terry Eagleton, it could have come from 
The Little Flowers. What Francis might add, or at least make more explicit, is that sometimes 
the hungry is a wolf whose territory has been disrupted by homes and buildings, the thirsty may 
be a bumblebee struggling with the heat spikes of climate change, the stranger on your 
doorstep may be a snake who was following a meal when they encountered your home, and 
the imprisoned may be a mountain slated to become a repository for nuclear waste or a field 
“developed” for retail.  
 
Builds Community: Francis’s Agapē 
Herrick (2018) reminds us that communities are not only made by geography but also 
constituted by common cause. “Communities are living creatures, nurtured and nourished by 
the practice of rhetoric” (Hogan 1998, 292). Not only are communities nurtured and nourished 
by rhetoric, but communities, in turn, nurture and nourish. 
During a period of discouragement and disenchantment, Francis sought the counsels of St. 
Clare and of Friar Sylvester.9 He asked them to pray for guidance on the course Francis’s life 
should take and then asked them to report God’s answers to their prayers. After he received 
confirmation from them for the life he was living, he rejoiced and with renewed passion 
preached to the people of Savurniano. From there, Francis saw trees full of birds and went “to 
preach to the birds, my sisters” and asked them to praise God because their flight and feathers 
were surely evidence that they were loved (Ugolino 1390/1998, 36). Francis considered this day 
one of the most beautiful of his life. “He felt that he owed to Clare these pure ardors that 
brought him into a secret and delicious communion with all beings; it was she who had revived 
him from sadness and hesitation” (Sweeney 2015, 91).  
The Franciscans are certainly a community. They are the largest religious order in the Catholic 
Church (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2019) and the community grew large even during Francis’s 
lifetime. But beyond those of the Franciscan order, Francis demonstrated a love and community 
for all fellow travelers on Earth. We have come to call this type of relentless, universal love 
agapē, and it is perhaps best illustrated with one of the many examples from The Little Flowers.  
Another story goes that Francis converted three thieves by showing that “nothing he had was 
available to be stolen” (Sweeney 31) because Francis owned nothing. Francis taught not to 
defend possessions against anyone; “Whoever may come, whether a friend or an enemy, even 
one who simply likes to steal, do not contend with him. It is not yours” (Franciscan teaching 
 
9 St. Clare of Assisi, born Chiara Offreduccio, founded the Order of Poor Ladies, now known as the Order of Saint 
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quoted in Sweeney 2019, 60). This is not to say Francis found thievery morally acceptable. 
When Friar Angelo first tried to deny the thieves bread and wine on account of their behavior, 
Francis bade Friar Angelo to take the bread and wine to the thieves and confess the Friar’s own 
cruelty in not attending to the needs of his fellow travelers. However, after this confession, 
Friar Angelo was to pray that the thieves to do no more wrong to others. If they could agree, 
they could return with Angelo and Francis would labor to make sure their needs were met 
(Ugolino 1390/1998).  
Certainly, Francis’s agapē came from a sacred place, and it both embodies and anticipates 
Eagleton’s (2007, 96) secular understanding of agapē that he articulates as the very meaning of 
life. Eagleton says that agapē is not about affection or admiration; it is the love of strangers, 
and it is a way of life, not a state of mind. “The flourishing of one individual comes about 
through the flourishing of others”. We may think of this way of living by imagining a jazz 
ensemble. Each member of a jazz ensemble is improvising and free to express oneself as one 
desires but plays with a “receptive sensitivity” to the “self-expressive performances” of the 
others. “Though each member contributes to ‘the greater good of the whole’, she (sic) does not 
by some grim-lipped self-sacrifice but simply by expressing herself (sic)” (Eagleton 2007, 100).” 
The jazz metaphor is in joyful harmony with and an evocative imagery of Naess’s understanding 
of humans as interdependent beings in a field of relations, or milieu (Naess 1989). Both 
Eagleton’s metaphor and Naess’s imagery give us different ways to imagine what it might mean 
to be in Francis’s spiritual democracy of all God’s creatures. Further, these varied perspectives 
on communal flourishing draw attention to shared goals in sacred and secular spheres. 
 
Distributes Power: Francis as Servant 
Although Francis is the head of his order, his rhetoric recognizes power and agency among the 
members of the Order and, indeed, among the more-than-human world. “Rhetoric is a form of 
social power” that raises questions of who is allowed to speak in society and about what 
(Herrick 2018, 19). Attending to the relations of rhetoric and power means attending to the 
fluidity and maintenance work of power. A Franciscan rhetoric seeks to opens the canals for 
power to flow rather than erecting dams to shore it up, and humility is the means by which we 
come to embrace this fluidity. Below are a few examples of how Francis’s rhetoric 
acknowledges the agency of others. 
Sometimes, Francis commands his friars to do something, such as when he bids Friar Leo to tell 
Francis that he is unworthy of a place in Heaven. He is not always obeyed, as Leo finds himself 
unable to fulfill Francis’s command and informs Francis that his voice is moved by God (Ugolino 
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than-human world (i.e., all entities are siblings, sometimes parents), he also refers to himself as 
a “servant.” Not only a servant of God but a servant of God’s creations, and Francis saw God’s 
creation everywhere. Francis “appreciated the wildness of mammals, plants, birds, and fish, 
knowing that they understood things humans cannot” (Sweeney 2019, 25). Thus, Francis 
preached to people and also to birds. He cleaned the bodies of suffering strangers and also built 
nests for dislocated turtledoves. He fed his companions and also wolves and thieves.  
Individual humility, the quality of being humble, works against an egocentric consolidation of 
power, and species-level humility would push against an anthropocentric locus of power.  This 
is the humility of deep ecology; this is the humility that decenters the self and the species. It is 
Francis’s humility and potential to “depose man from his monarchy over creation” that 
convinced White (1206/1967) that Francis could be a redemptive model for the role of 
Christianity in our current ecological crisis. 
 
Conclusion 
Humanity will only live a different kind of existence if there is “a sufficiently shared desire 
among humans. It won’t happen through a triumph of the will … if it happens it will only be 
through desire” (Massumi 2002, 123). Desire is why the rhetoric of the son of a wealthy cloth 
merchant who turned his chivalric spirituality outward and invited others to do the same 
matters. TGBis not the answer, and neither is Francis as human nor as saint nor even Franciscan 
embodied rhetoric. However, a green Bible that directs our attention to the lessons of ecology 
and a Bible study that asks questions about humanity from a Franciscan perspective may help 
us ask better, deeper questions of ourselves as ecological beings and help evoke new desires. 
How are our actions building community with the more-than-human world? Do our texts 
and/or prayers align with our actions? Or, perhaps more importantly, do our actions align with 
our prayers and texts? How are our epistemological and moral practices distributing or shoring 
up power? Do our everyday lived experiences participate in or work against ecological 
advocacy?  
Undoubtedly, these new desires are not easy. If we desire to see ourselves as companions in 
the more-than-human world, we will—as Abram (2020) acknowledges—experience 
humiliation. The cognitive dissonance that can occur when we interrogate our own practices as 
companions in a more-than-human world is extremely uncomfortable. Francis was no stranger 
to humiliation, but like Francis, from this humiliation, we may find our way to a mobilizing 
humility. A humility that does not see the Earth as present-at-hand, as Heidegger (2013) would 
say, but as possessing its own intrinsic worth and as full of knowledge that exceeds us but with 
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a non-anthropocentric manner, did not need to speak to Wittgenstein’s lion to know that the 
lion shares the intersubjective desire to continue living.10 Francis did not need to know what it 
is to be a Nagelian bat to feel a sense of “radical compassion,” a compassion that understands 
genuine knowledge of another is infinitely deferred but refuses to negate the experience of 
another in favor of my own (Bollmer 2013, 65).11 
Humility may not sound as thrilling as human mastery, achievement, and progress. The trouble 
with mastery is that it seems to be about ends, but it reveals itself time and again to be about 
means, a way of living. The trouble with mastery and progress is that they are insatiable, never 
satisfied or fulfilled. Mastery may be insatiable, but humility may be daunting. “Far from 
boasting of some privileged human status, it [an animalistic humanism] would never disregard 
our humble, and maybe even humiliating, place in the totality of the natural order” (Burke 
1972, p. 54). So, what does humility have to offer?  
Joy. During a walk from Assisi to a nearby town, Francis and Friar Leo encountered some rain. 
Leo was not in the best spirits, and so an upbeat Francis decided to share with Leo the source of 
“perfect joy” (Ugolino 1390/1998, 19). Of course, Francis did not just tell Leo the answer, much 
to the dismay of Leo and many a student in the history of teacher-student relationships. 
Instead, Francis first explicated joy by its negation. Joy was not morality or education. Neither 
was it the existence of miracles nor even the revelation of metaphysical truth. We can imagine 
Leo’s face during this long, walking lecture in the rain when Leo says, “Father, I pray you in the 
name of God to tell me wherein is perfect joy?” (Ugolino 1390/1998, 20). Francis tells him: 
If, when we arrive, we’re wet down to the bones, and shivering from cold, 
hungry as can be, and we knock on the door to signal our arrival, and a friar 
opens it but doesn’t recognize us, and slams it shut in our faces, fearful that 
we’ve come to rob him, and we’re left standing in this rain even longer, and then 
perhaps we knock again and someone else opens the door and hits us with 
sticks, yelling at us like strangers or robbers, if we remain patient and humble 
and loving, even then, through all of that, well, that, Leo, reveals the source of 
perfect joy. (Sweeney 2019, 102) 
Perfect joy is the feeling of going to bed in the evening knowing you did your best. To flourish is 
 
10 In Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein comments that, “If a lion could speak, we could not 
understand him” (1953, 223). First, why would we assume that we could understanding Lionish? Second, even if 
Lionish were translated into our first languages, the human and lion experience of the world is presumed to be so 
remarkably different that the lion’s utterances would lack meaning for humans.    
11 In 1974, philosopher Thomas Nagel asked, “What is it like to be a bat?” This question explores the 
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to strive to do better each day and to stay with the trouble, as Haraway (2018) urges us, despite 
the dire predictions that come from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or the 
troubling headlines of the day. The struggle to be the best versions of ourselves, even if the 
face of astounding environmental crises, is the redemption of our guilt as ecological beings. 
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